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I 
INTRODUCTION 
One Sunday morning, a slightly odd “wedding announcement” appeared in 
the Style section of the New York Times.1 It was an announcement that caught a 
number of regular readers a little off-guard, destabilizing us, even if only for a 
few seconds. The announcement was actually three announcements: Barbara 
Dutton and Bill Henrickson, Nicolette Grant and Bill Hendrickson, and 
Margene Heffman and Bill Henrickson, each of whom were to be married in 
Utah that evening. It quickly became clear, if after momentary disorientation, 
that this was an advertisement for the premier of Big Love, HBO’s drama series 
on polygamy.2 Bill Henrickson, played by Bill Paxton, has three wives—Barb, 
Nicki, and Margene—and seven children in suburban Salt Lake City. The idea 
is that the Henricksons—all eleven of them—are just an “average, normal 
polygamist family.” And they seem very normal indeed, at least in contrast to 
the world from which they have broken away: Juniper Creek, a grim, 
fundamentalist compound ruled by the messianic prophet, Roman Grant, with 
his fourteen wives, thirty-one children, and 187 grandchildren. In comparison, 
the Henricksons do look like an average suburban family, with average, 
suburban family problems—just more of them.  
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 1. Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2006, at ST13. 
 2. Big Love (HBO television series). 
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The parallels between Big Love’s representation of polygamy and 
contemporary debates around same-sex marriage are too obvious to miss. The 
show’s producers are two gay men who, rather than recoil in horror from the 
association between same-sex marriage and polygamy, provocatively ski down 
the slippery slope.3 This is apparent from the show’s inception, performed in the 
mock wedding announcements in the New York Times. The style section of the 
New York Times began announcing gay unions in 2002—two years before same-
sex marriage became a legal reality anywhere in the United States.4 The mock 
announcement plays on a similar gap between the cultural and legal recognition 
of marriage, using the power of the cultural to present marriage as real in the 
here and now, even in the absence of legal recognition. It is the most public 
 
 3. The question of a slippery slope between same-sex marriage and polygamy is a subject of 
considerable controversy. Opponents of same-sex marriage argue that recognizing the former will lead 
inevitably to recognition of the latter. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional 
Marriage, 15 J. L. & POL. 581, 628–31 (1999). Proponents of same-sex marriage often argue that is 
possible to distinguish between the two forms of marriage and that the recognition of same-sex 
marriage does not lead inevitably down a slippery slope to polygamy. See, e.g., Hema Chatlani, In 
Defense of Marriage: Why Same-Sex Marriage Will Not Lead Us Down a Slippery Slope Toward the 
Legalization of Polygamy, 6 APPALACHIAN J.L. 101, 128–32 (2006); James M. Donovan, Rock-Salting 
the Slippery Slope: Why Same-Sex Marriage Is Not a Commitment to Polygamous Marriage, 29 N. KY. 
L. REV. 521 (2002); Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and 
Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1615–18 (1997). 
 4. Times Will Begin Reporting Gay Couples’ Ceremonies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2002, at 130. The 
first announcement appeared on September 1, 2002, announcing the union of Daniel Gross and Steven 
Goldstein. See Weddings/Celebrations; Daniel Gross, Steven Goldstein, N.Y. TIMES, at 912. When the 
New York Times began to run these announcements, the Netherlands had already become the first 
country to recognize same-sex marriages in 2001. Belgium and Canada followed in 2003. 
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performance of the public performance of marriage, riffing on the power of the 
New York Times wedding announcements—which are, after all, an ultimate sign 
of societal status. 
There are many parallels between same-sex marriage and polygamy. 
Polygamy has long been one of the bogeymen of the law of conflicts. The law of 
recognizing marriages celebrated abroad has often been articulated to 
specifically disallow the recognition of polygamous marriages. Although the 
general principle was one of place-of-celebration, that is, a marriage was 
recognized as valid if it was valid in the place where it was celebrated, an 
exception was made for polygamy.5 Polygamy long operated as a trope of the 
public-policy exception to the common-law place-of-celebration rule, deployed 
to justify, in the most obvious way, the need for such an exception.6 Today, it is 
same-sex marriage that is occupying this trope, becoming the new bogeyman in 
the law of conflicts. Indeed, it arguably occupies an even more ominous space, 
since same-sex marriage has been legalized in at least one state in the country, 
and civil unions have been recognized in several others.7 
Yet the shadow of polygamy lingers, now in the guise of a slippery slope: 
same-sex marriage becomes the obvious example of the need for a public-policy 
exception—“if it is not a legitimate exception, what is?”—leading in turn to the 
fear of the ultimate trope, polygamy. Opponents to same-sex marriage 
repeatedly raise the slippery-slope argument: that its recognition will lead 
inexorably to recognizing polygamy and other abominations, like incest and 
 
 5. As the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 132 (1934) stated, 
A marriage which is against the law of the state of domicil of either party, though the 
requirements of the law of the state of celebration have been complied with, will be invalid 
everywhere in the following cases: (a) polygamous marriage, (b) incestuous marriage between 
persons so closely related that their marriage is contrary to a strong public policy of the 
domicil, (c) marriage between persons of different races where such marriages are of the 
domicil regarded as odious . . . . 
 6. According to Koppelman, the cases “involved subsequent marriages of parties who had 
obtained divorces, at a time when divorced persons were often forbidden to remarry. . . . [C]ases 
occasionally arose involving polygamous or potentially polygamous marriages contracted abroad. With 
few exceptions, courts recognized these marriages.” Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice 
of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921, 947–48 (1998). 
It is, at the same time, a rather paradoxical trope of the exception, since polygamy was never 
legalized by any American state. As Koppelman notes in Recognition and Enforcement of Same-Sex 
Marriage: Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Unions: A Handbook for Judges, “the 
public policy exception to marriage recognition has been invoked primarily in three contexts: 
polygamy, incest, and miscegenation.” 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143, 2148–49 (2005) [hereinafter Interstate 
Recognition]. However, in his view, polygamy and incest have been “misnomers,” since “[n]o state ever 
recognized polygamy. Nor did any state ever violate ‘the core instances of the incest taboo by legalizing 
parent-child or sibling marriages; the incest cases involved marriages between first cousins, aunts and 
nephews, uncles and nieces, or even more remote relations.’” Id. at 2149.  
 7. In Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 298 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court held that the opposite-sex restriction on marriage was unconstitutional, and gave the state 
legislature 180 days to take appropriate action. Governor Mitt Romney ordered town clerks to begin 
issuing marriage licenses on May 17, 2004. Vermont, New Jersey, Connecticut, and New Hampshire 
have recognized civil unions. 
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bestiality.8 Conversely, as liberal scholars seek to make the case for the 
interjurisdictional recognition of same-sex marriage, they, too, must negotiate 
this slippery slope. But they do so through denial, avoiding the association like 
the plague and insisting that the monogamous nature of marriage can, and will, 
hold.9 Just as in Big Love, same-sex marriage is never more than one degree of 
separation from polygamy. 
Though much more could be said of these tropes in the fraught relationship 
between same-sex marriage and polygamy, my intention in raising the 
association in the context of Big Love is somewhat different. I am interested in 
the relationship between legal and cultural recognition, or, more specifically, in 
the gaps and fissures that may exist somewhere in between. My focus is on 
“migrating marriages”10—that is, same-sex marriages or civil unions entered in 
one jurisdiction that migrate to another and seek recognition, calling upon the 
private law of conflicts. These migrating-marriage cases have not been 
particularly successful in obtaining legal recognition. But, as I argue in this 
article, these migrating-marriage cases cannot be measured in terms of the legal 
outcome of the conflicts dispute alone. Rather, these cases can be seen through 
the lens of the New York Times mock announcement and Big Love, in which 
marriages are produced as culturally real in the here and now, even when legal 
recognition remains elusive. The movement of such marriages from the ethos of 
the media toward the private law of conflicts—while sometimes directed at a 
private remedy between two private parties—is, like the wedding 
announcements, a very public gesture seeking to advance the temporal and 
geographic reality of same-sex marriage. In the process, these migrating 
marriages and their turn to conflicts place same-sex marriage in a kind of state 
of liminality, betwixt and between recognition and nonrecognition. The sections 
that follow explore the rise of conflicts as a site of same-sex-marriage politics 
and the way in which these migrating-marriage cases are implicated in the 
politics of recognition, producing same-sex marriage as culturally—if not always 
legally—real, in the here and now. 
 
 8. This association between same-sex marriage and polygamy was made repeatedly by opponents 
of same-sex marriage during the Congressional debates over the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). 
See David L. Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 53 (1997). 
 9. See Chatlani, supra note 3, at 128–32. However, not all proponents of same-sex marriage 
disavow the association. See, e.g., Chambers, supra note 8, at 53. 
 10. I use the term “migrating marriages” to describe the full range of traveling marriages and civil 
unions, that is, marriages and unions that are entered into in one jurisdiction, and for a variety of 
reasons, then travel to another jurisdiction where some legal recognition is sought. My terminology 
deviates from some of the more standard descriptions in the law of marriage recognition, which 
distinguishes between “evasive marriages” and “migratory” or “mobile marriages.” Evasive marriages 
are those whose parties travel out of state for the specific purpose of avoiding their own state’s 
marriage prohibitions, then return to their home state after the marriage. Migratory marriages are 
those whose parties were legally married in their home state, but subsequently move to a state in which 
their marriage is not recognized. According to several authorities, evasive marriages are not valid, while 
migratory marriages are sometimes valid. See, e.g., Koppelman, Interstate Recognition, supra note 6, at 
2152–59; Linda Silberman, Same-Sex Marriage: Refining the Conflict of Laws Analysis, 153 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2195, 2198–208 (2005). 
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II 
MIGRATING MARRIAGES 
The law of conflicts has, over the last fifteen years, become a hot spot in 
same-sex-marriage law and politics in the United States. A debate over 
interstate recognition of same-sex marriage was sparked by the Hawaii 
Supreme Court decision in Baehr v. Lewin suggesting that the ban on same-sex 
marriage might be unconstitutional.11 Although the court did not strike down 
the ban in this case, the ruling started a panic about the interjurisdictional 
domino effect of one state’s recognition of same-sex marriage. The fear was that 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution12 would compel other states 
to recognize Hawaii’s same-sex marriages.13 Congress passed the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA), which defined marriage for federal purposes as the 
union of a man and a woman, and amended the Full Faith and Credit Clause to 
exempt same-sex marriage from recognition under its principles.14 Individual 
states followed suit, with forty states passing mini-DOMAs defining marriage in 
opposite-sex terms, and expressly refusing to recognize same-sex marriages 
validly celebrated in another jurisdiction.15 Alongside these political 
 
 11. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993), superseded by constitutional amendment, HAW. 
CONST. art. I, §23 (amended 1998). In this case, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the ban on same-
sex marriage triggers strict scrutiny and therefore that the ban must further compelling state interests 
and must be narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessary violations of constitutional rights. The question  
whether there was a compelling state interest was remanded. It was, however, this conclusion—that the 
ban on same-sex marriage might be unconstitutional—that set off the ensuing panic. On remand, in 
Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), the Court held that the state 
had failed to sustain its burden of establishing a compelling state interest. The decision was, however, 
effectively overruled when in 1998, Hawaiian voters approved a constitutional amendment approving 
that marriage be reserved to opposite-sex couples. HAW. CONST. art. I, §23 (amended 1998). 
 12. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 13. See Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem of Non-Uniform 
Marriage Laws, 84 OR. L. REV. 433, 449 (2005), citing Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v. General Motors: 
Implications for Interjurisdictional Recognition of Non-Traditional Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON  L. REV. 
147, 152–53 (1998) (noting that “[the] full faith and credit [argument] was ‘advanced mostly in student 
writing and the popular press’”). As Grossman notes, 
[f]or proponents, the claim represented both wishful thinking and a component of their 
strategy to gain marriage rights nationwide. For opponents of same-sex marriage generally, 
this assertion galvanized forces, imposed time pressure on states to protect themselves from 
an exported marriage policy, and provided a powerful rhetoric to trigger legislative reactions. 
Id. Many conflicts scholars have argued that this full-faith-and-credit fear was entirely misplaced, since 
the clause as interpreted by the courts has never compelled a state to recognize a marriage of another 
state. Koppelman writes, for example, that 
[t]he clause requires states only to recognize other states’ judgments rendered after 
adversarial proceedings. There is almost no authority for the proposition that full faith and 
credit applies to marriage, and there is a great deal of authority to the contrary, indicating that 
states may decline to recognize foreign marriages when those marriages are contrary to the 
strong public policy of the forum state. 
Interstate Recognition, supra note 6, at 2146–47. 
 14. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000). 
 15. See Koppelman, Interstate Recognition, supra note 6, at 2165–94 for a review of the state 
statutes barring same-sex marriage. The Full Faith and Credit Clause—and in turn, DOMA—apply 
only as between U.S. states, not between the U.S. and other countries. Therefore, it is applicable only 
to marriages that migrate between U.S. states, not to those that cross national borders. 
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developments has been a veritable explosion of conflicts scholarship on the 
question of interstate and (to a lesser degree) international recognition of same-
sex marriage. Liberal and progressive scholars, with a kind of revitalized 
energy, have sought to deploy the tools of their trade to help same-sex 
marriages migrate from their place of celebration to the rest of the country.16 
Individuals have begun to bring these migrating marriages to court. There 
are three types of cases so far: dissolution, legal incidents, and precedential 
recognition. The dissolution cases present a classic conflict-of-laws problem. 
Parties married in a jurisdiction that recognizes same-sex marriage 
(Massachusetts or Canada) or civil unions (Vermont), are now domiciled 
somewhere else and want to dissolve the marriage. But the state of their current 
domicile does not recognize same-sex marriage. The question becomes whether 
the courts of the state will recognize the marriage for the purposes of dissolving 
it, that is, of granting a divorce. In Salucco v. Alldredge, a Vermont civil union 
was dissolved in Massachusetts.17 In M.G. v. S. G., a West Virginia court 
dissolved a Vermont civil union.18 Other dissolution cases have been less 
successful. Connecticut courts have refused to dissolve a Vermont civil union19 
and a Massachusetts marriage.20 In a more mixed result, in Gonzalez v. Greene, 
a New York court refused to recognize a same-sex marriage entered into by two 
New York residents in Massachusetts, noting that, according to Massachusetts 
 
 16. See, e.g., Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and Choice-of-Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are 
We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1033 (1994) (arguing that faithful 
application of choice-of-law principles is necessary to end discrimination against same-sex marriages); 
Stanley E. Cox, Nine Questions About Same-Sex Marriage Conflicts, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 361 (2006) 
(proffering nine questions about same-sex marriage and conflict of laws and concluding that the 
Defense of Marriage Act should be overruled as an unconstitutional violation of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause); Stanley E. Cox, Red States, Blue States, Marriage Debates, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 637 
(2005) (arguing that sensible policy dictates that states should not, and perhaps constitutionally cannot, 
undermine the marital policies of other states); Koppelman, Interstate Recognition, supra note 6 
(surveying the body of law governing recognition of same-sex marriages); Larry Kramer, Same-Sex 
Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 
(1997) (arguing that the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires states to honor other states’ policies 
without discriminating in choice of law based on judgments about those policies); William A. Reppy, 
Jr., The Framework of Full Faith and Credit and Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 3 AVE 
MARIA L. REV. 393 (2005) (analyzing the federal statute that requires states to give full faith and credit 
to the records of other states and concluding that this statute compels states to recognize the same-sex 
marriages and civil unions of other states). Some argued that either DOMA or the public-policy 
exception to the law-of-celebration rule in conflicts, or both, are unconstitutional. Others argued in 
favor of a more nuanced approach that applies the “well-developed body of law on the question of 
whether and when to recognize extraterritorial marriages that are contrary to the forum’s public 
policy.” Koppelman, Recognition and Enforcement of Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 6, at 2144. 
 17. No. 02E0087GC1, 2004 WL 864459 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 2004). 
 18. See Barbara J. Cox, Using An “Incidents of Marriage” Analysis When Considering Interstate 
Recognition of Same-Sex Couples’ Marriages, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 13 WIDENER 
L.J. 699, 738–42 (2004) (discussing In re M.G. v. S.G.). 
 19. See Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (holding that because civil 
unions are not treated as family matters, the court does not have jurisdiction to dissolve them and that 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause is not implicated because the plaintiff had sufficient contacts in 
Connecticut to apply Connecticut law). 
 20. See Lane v. Albanese, 39 Conn. L. Rptr. 3 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2005) (dismissing the case for lack 
of subject-matter jurisdiction). 
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law, marriages entered by nonresidents were not valid; the court nonetheless 
did enforce a separation agreement negotiated between the cohabiting parties.21 
There are also several dissolution cases in which third parties have sought to 
challenge the dissolution of Vermont civil unions. In these cases, the private 
dimension of the dissolution remedy was contested on the basis of the public 
interest in the nonrecognition of same-sex marriage. For example, in KJB v. 
JSP, the dissolution of a Vermont civil union was unsuccessfully challenged by a 
group of politicians and citizens.22 In Texas, the Attorney General intervened 
after a district court dissolved a Vermont civil union, stating that state courts 
did not have jurisdiction to do so.23 The decision was then vacated, and the 
Texas legislature passed a law stating that civil unions would not be recognized 
in the state. 
In a second set of cases, parties to a marriage or a civil union seek to have its 
legal incidents enforced in another jurisdiction. In these cases, private parties 
seek to invoke the law of conflicts to obtain a public or private right attached to 
marriage; the validity of the marriage is an incidental question.24 The courts 
have mostly refused to recognize same-sex marriages and civil unions for any 
such purposes. For example, the courts have denied recognition of Vermont 
civil unions for a wrongful-death suit25 and a claim for employment health 
benefits26 and denied recognition of Canadian same-sex marriages for a disabled 
 
 21. Gonzalez v. Green, 831 N.Y.S.2d 856 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207,   
§ 11 (2008)) (“No marriage shall be contracted in this commonwealth by a party residing and intending 
to continue to reside in another jurisdiction if such marriage would be void if contracted in such other 
jurisdiction, and every marriage contracted in this commonwealth in violation hereof shall be null and 
void.”). This provision was upheld by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Cote-Whitacre v. 
Department of Public Health, 844 N.E.2d 623 (Mass. 2006) (finding that the statute is constitutional 
because both state residents and nonresidents are treated alike). 
Several dissolution cases are ongoing. In Chambers v. Ormiston, a same-sex couple that was married 
while domiciled in Massachusetts subsequently moved to Rhode Island and sought a divorce. The 
Rhode Island Family Court asked the Supreme Court whether it had jurisdiction to grant the divorce, 
and the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Family Court with a series of factual questions that 
needed to be determined. Chambers v. Ormiston, 916 A.2d 758 (R.I. 2007). In O’Darling v. O’Darling, 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court was asked to review a divorce unknowingly issued to a same-sex couple 
who had married in Toronto. In this case, the Tulsa Special District Judge issued the divorce decree 
without realizing that the couple was of the same sex. The divorce had not been contested, and the 
judge routinely approved it based on the court papers, in which the parties’ first names appeared only 
as initials. See State Litigation Notes, LESBIANGAYLAWNOTES 233 (Arthur S. Leonard ed., Dec. 2006). 
 22. The Iowa district court judge issued a revised opinion, stating that he did not have jurisdiction 
to dissolve a civil union under state law, but that he could provide relief under his equitable jurisdiction. 
The petitioners maintained their challenge to the amended decree, but the Iowa Supreme Court 
subsequently dismissed their petition on the basis that they lacked standing. Alons v. Iowa Dist. Court, 
698 N.W.2d 858 (Iowa 2005). 
 23. See Cox, supra note 18, at 736 (discussing In re R.S. and J.A.). 
 24. EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 13.3 (4th ed. 2004). 
 25. Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 802 N.Y.S.2d 479 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). 
 26. Martinez v. County of Monroe, No. 05/00433 (N.Y. July 27, 2007). Although Martinez is 
appealing the ruling, the union representing Martinez succeeded in having domestic partnerships 
recognized in its new contract, and since January 1, 2006, Martinez’s partner has been receiving health 
benefits. See N.Y. Court Rejects Comity Claim for Canadian Same-Sex Marriage, 
LESBIANGAYLAWNOTES 233 (Arthur S. Leonard ed., September 2006). 
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veteran’s exemption claim27 and a joint bankruptcy claim.28 Only one case to 
date has recognized a Vermont civil union, but this recognition came at the 
behest of a Vermont court involved in a complex interjurisdictional wrangle: in 
Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, the Vermont Supreme Court recognized a 
Vermont civil union for the purposes of determining parentage in a Virginia 
custody dispute.29 The Virginia Court of Appeals subsequently remanded the 
case to trial court, with the instruction to extend full faith and credit to the 
custody-and-visitation order of the Vermont court. 30 
In the third type of case, parties to a marriage or civil union seek state 
recognition of their marriage or civil union for the purposes of precedential 
recognition. Unlike the first and second types of case, in which the parties are 
seeking a very particular right or benefit (divorce in the first, a particular state 
marriage benefit in the second), here the plaintiffs are seeking recognition of 
their marriage for the purposes of all rights and responsibilities associated with 
marriage.31 This is a very public gesture, a public performance of same-sex 
marriage that deploys the tools of the law of conflicts. There is only one such 
case to date: Wilson v. Ake,32 in which the plaintiffs, Reverend Nancy Wilson 
and Paula Schoenwether, sought recognition of their Massachusetts marriage 
license in Florida. When the clerk refused, they sought a declaratory judgment 
asking the Florida District Court to declare both DOMA and the Florida 
marriage unconstitutional. They argued, inter alia, that DOMA exceeded 
congressional power under the Full Faith and Credit clause. The court 
disagreed and dismissed their case.33 
A glance at the scoreboard in these admittedly early days of migrating-
same-sex-marriage cases suggests that the obvious trend is one of 
nonrecognition. The courts are overwhelmingly taking the position that if their 
states do not recognize civil unions or same-sex marriage, then they will not 
recognize Vermont, Massachusetts, or Canadian unions. These early results also 
suggest that the distinction between “evasive” and “migratory marriages” may 
not be that helpful in predicting recognition. Most of the cases to date have 
involved evasive marriages, that is, marriages whose parties travel out of state 
to get married or enter civil unions because their own state does not allow them 
to do so. Yet very few of these courts have even engaged the distinctions 
 
 27. Hennefeld v. Township of Montclair, 22 N.J. Tax 166 (2008). 
 28. In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004). 
 29. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2006). 
 30. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330 (Va. Ct. App. 2006). 
 31. Moreover, these plaintiffs are seeking not only recognition in the “here and now,” but a court 
order that would qualify for a full-faith-and-credit claim in the rest of country, thus attempting to 
secure recognition in the “there and then.” 
 32. 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005). 
 33. Id. According to the court, the plaintiff’s mistaken approach to the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause would allow one state to effectively create national policy. The court noted further that “[u]nder 
Plaintiff’s interpretation of the clause, a single State could mandate that all the States recognize bigamy, 
polygamy, marriages between blood relatives or marriages involving minor children.” Id. at 1304  n.6. 
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between evasive and migratory marriages.34 But, perhaps more significantly, the 
more general tendency seen in the cases is the short shrift given to the 
principles of conflict of laws. Many refer—often in the most cursory way—to a 
full-faith-and-credit claim made by the parties, but dismiss the relevance of the 
clause on the basis of either DOMA or the public-policy exception, or both.35 
Very few cases even raise the principle of comity, and none actually apply it.36 
Although the conflicts scholars produce sophisticated arguments about the 
principles of the law of conflicts, the courts by and large ignore these doctrinal 
disputes and arguments, deciding the cases on the basis of a state’s stated 
opposition to same-sex marriage. Rather than be hidden beyond the 
technicalities of conflict rules, the underlying politics of same-sex marriage is 
virtually dispositive. 
III 
ANTINOMIES OF NONRECOGNITION 
Annelise Riles has described the turn toward the private as “a turn away 
from concerns with culture, politics, [and] history,” and a turn “towards legal 
 
 34. One of the plaintiffs in Miller-Jenkins raised an evasive-marriage argument, submitting that the 
civil union should not be recognized as valid because it was in violation of a Vermont law prohibiting 
residents of Vermont from traveling to another state to enter a legal union that is void in Vermont, 
then returning to Vermont to force recognition. Initial Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 7, Miller-
Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2006) (No. 454-11-03 Rddm). Lisa Miller argued that the 
same rule would apply to “non-residents [traveling to] Vermont to enter into marriages considered void 
in their home state.” Id. However, the Vermont Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that if the 
Vermont civil-union law had intended to exclude nonresidents, it would have done so explicitly as in 
the marriage law. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 964–65 (Vt. 2006). 
 35. In Rosengarten, Lane v. Albanese, Miller-Jenkins, and Wilson, the courts all affirm the public-
policy exception to full faith and credit. Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, 178 (Conn. App. 2002) 
(“The [Full Faith and Credit] clause  . . . obligate[s] the forum State to take jurisdiction and to apply 
foreign law, subject to the forum’s own interest in furthering its public policy.”) (emphasis added); Lane 
v. Albanese, 39 Conn. L. Rptr. 3, 4 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2005) (“With respect to marriage, the public 
policy exception [to the Full Faith and Credit Clause] would permit a state to decline to honor a 
marriage contracted in another state if it violates the public policy of the reviewing state.”); Wilson v. 
Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303–04 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (“Florida is not required to recognize or apply 
Massachusetts’ same-sex marriage law because it clearly conflicts with Florida’s legitimate public policy 
of opposing same-sex marriage.”); Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 962 (Vt. 2006) (“[I]n 
no instance does DOMA require a court in one state to give full faith and credit to the decision of a 
court in another state. Its sole purpose is to provide an authorization not to give full faith and credit in 
the circumstances covered by the statute.”). 
 36. Of the reported cases, the court in Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hospital simply concluded, with 
virtually no discussion, that the principles of comity did not apply. See Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 
802 N.Y.S.2d 479, 479 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). In both In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 133–34 (Bankr. W.D. 
Wash. 2004), and Hennefeld v. Township of Montclair, 22 N.J. Tax 166, 178–84 (2008), the courts 
briefly discussed comity, but refused to apply it to the Canadian same-sex marriages. It is significant 
that these are the only two cases involving foreign marriages, and they could not be resolved within a 
Full Faith and Credit–DOMA framework. Yet, ultimately, the result was similar—evidencing little 
engagement with the principles of comity, and no recognition of the marriage. The only exception to 
the passing dismissal of its relevance is seen in the dissenting opinion in Langan, in which the judge 
would have recognized the civil union on the principle of comity. See Langan, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 483–86 
(Fisher, J., dissenting). 
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technology”37 In the context of same-sex marriage, what is remarkable—that is, 
worthy of being remarked upon—is the extent to which this turn remains so 
transparently in the service of culture, politics, and history. The turn toward the 
private, in both conflicts scholarship and litigation, is part of a recognition 
strategy. The scholars who argue in favor of the interjurisdictional recognition 
of same-sex marriages are deploying the technical tools of their trade to 
advance a pro-same-sex marriage politics, a liberal politics of recognition and 
equality.38 Their opponents—the scholars who argue against any 
interjurisdictional recognition of same-sex marriage—are, conversely, deploying 
their technical tools in the service of a conservative politics of the traditional 
family. Both sides wear their recognition or nonrecognition politics on their 
sleeves, notwithstanding the attempt to dress them up in more technical 
clothes.39 
The plaintiffs in the migrating-marriage cases might be distinguished from 
the advocacy scholarship, since they might be framed as seeking a private or 
individualized remedy to a private dispute. Yet they, too, are engaged in these 
political contestations of same-sex-marriage recognition—some by design, and 
others by circumstance. Some—particularly those in the recognition cases—are 
explicitly seeking to advance the cultural and legal legitimacy of same-sex 
marriage. Reverend Nancy Wilson and Paula Schoenwether were involved in a 
very political battle, challenging the constitutionality of DOMA and Florida 
marriage law for the purpose of having their Massachusetts marriage 
recognized. A judgment in their favor would also trigger a full-faith-and-credit 
claim to have their marriage recognized by other states outside of Florida.40 
Wilson, the Moderator of the Universal Fellowship of Metropolitan 
Community Churches, and Schoenwether, her partner of twenty-eight years, 
have long been involved in gay-and-lesbian rights. Their battle was very 
explicitly one intended to advance same-sex-marriage rights.41 
 
 37. Annelise Riles, Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reason in the Global Financial Markets (book 
manuscript on file with author). 
 38. Not all of these conflict scholars argue in favor of blanket recognition of migrating same-sex 
marriage, but at a minimum they argue in favor of some recognition in some circumstances. They 
depend, for example, on an interest analysis or on an incidents-of-marriage analysis, or on both. 
Alternatively, or in addition, the scholars depend on whether the marriage is evasive, migratory, or 
visitor, or two or three of these categories together. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 13; Koppelman, 
Interstate Recognition, supra note 6; Silberman, supra note 10. 
 39. It is also worth noting that the rush to conflicts has included many who are not conflicts 
scholars by trade, but who have followed same-sex marriage politics onto the terrain of conflicts of 
laws, using it as a site of advancing (or conversely, blocking) same-sex-marriage recognition. This 
explicitly political objective may explain the politics-over-technologies tone of much of this scholarship. 
 40. The Full Faith and Credit Clause has never been understood to compel one state to recognize 
another state’s marriage. Rather, as Koppelman’s Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and 
Civil Unions, supra note 6, at 2146, notes, “the clause requires states only to recognize other states’ 
judgments rendered after adversarial proceedings.” This case was an attempt to obtain a judgment that 
recognized the marriage, as a judgment would therefore trigger the recognition requirements of the 
Clause. 
 41. See, e.g., Melissa Followell, Gay Florida Couple Submit Federal Lawsuit, GAY CHRISTIAN 
NEWS, July 23, 2004, http://www.a-gay-christian-testimony.com/GayRights07-23-04C.html (last visited 
COSSMAN_BOOK PROOF_FINAL.DOC 10/27/2008  7:46:13 AM 
Summer 2008] BETWIXT AND BETWEEN RECOGNITION 163 
Other plaintiffs may have found themselves in the cultural and political 
battlefield more by circumstance than by design. Ironically, those seeking 
dissolution of their marital status are effectively forced to litigate the validity of 
their marriages in the first place. Yet, for at least some of the plaintiffs, 
dissolution was an important, indeed vital, part of recognition. One woman, 
who entered into a civil union in Vermont and subsequently sought dissolution 
in New Jersey, wrote, 
Why bother getting a legal dissolution? . . . Talking to a friend, I struggled to put into 
words why it felt so vital. It wasn’t for financial reasons: we had no children, no joint 
property. “Why, not suing for dissolution would invalidate the whole thing,” she said 
wisely. And that was it, the word I was searching for. I would not invalidate our civil 
union by agreeing that it didn’t count.42 
For her, the legal recognition of divorce was part of the process of relationship 
recognition, in terms of both the legal incidents that might be attached, and the 
sheer power of recognition: 
I still believe that marriage will bring most of us incredible blessings. But when our 
marriages don’t work, I hope we insist on proper divorces, with lawyers and judges in 
our courts, because we deserve to honor our unions with this validation too. We 
deserve help breaking up households and navigating custody of children. Just as we 
insist on the right to marry, we have to demand that the legal system help us dissolve 
our unions when we have to. Because these are not empty ceremonial gestures we are 
making in Vermont and Massachusetts and Oregon and San Francisco. Our marriages 
count.43 
Although some of the plaintiffs in the dissolution cases may simply have been 
seeking a legal remedy,44 ensuring that they are free from the status and 
limitations of marital status, at least some of the plaintiffs brought their cases 
with the cultural battlefield of same-sex marriage very much in mind. 
The conflicts scholars and plaintiffs alike can be seen to be engaged in a 
project of producing same-sex marriage in the here and now. It is an example of 
 
June 1, 2008) (including plaintiffs’ discussion of their lawsuit). It was, however, a controversial political 
battle not endorsed by gay-and-lesbian organizations. See, e.g., Ann Rostow, Florida Suit Challenges 
Federal Marriage Law, THE ADVOC., July 21, 2004, available at 
http://www.planetout.com/news/article.html?date=2004/07/21/1 (last visited Feb. 2, 2008) (including the 
comments of Kate Kendall of the National Center for Lesbian Rights); Kavan Peterson, Florida 
Lawyer Seeking Gay Marriage Limelight, Stateline.org (Aug. 17, 2005), available at 
http://legalminds.lp.findlaw.com/list/queerlaw/frm05746.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2008) (detailing the 
comments of Matt Foreman, Executive Director of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force). 
 42. Kathy Anderson, My Vermont Divorce, THE ADVOC., Sept. 28, 2004, at 10. 
 43. Id. 
 44. This is perhaps even more arguable in relation to those litigants seeking a legal incident of 
marriage—a bankruptcy benefit, a disability pension, a wrongful-death claim, a parentage claim. These 
plaintiffs were each seeking some kind of marital recognition, often in a time of difficulty. For example, 
in both Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 802 N.Y.S.2d 479, 479 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005), and In re Kandu, 
315 B.R. 123, 133–34 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004), the plaintiff’s same-sex partner had died, with the 
former trying to bring a wrongful-death suit, and the latter seeking bankruptcy protection. In Miller-
Jenkins, the former couple was involved in a bitter custody dispute, and the nonbiological mother was 
desperately seeking recognition of her parentage. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 
2006). Although these plaintiffs may be forced to litigate the validity of their marriages and are thereby 
indirectly dragged into the fray of marriage recognition, their interests appear to be much more of 
material benefit than of symbolic recognition. 
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the politics of the present—that is, the way in which same-sex marriages are no 
longer part of an imagined future, but are becoming part of the present.45 The 
discursive strategy is one of producing same-sex marriage as real in the present, 
by taking a same-sex marriage and trying to expand its recognition beyond its 
place of celebration. The legal cases each do this, even if just a little, even when 
they fail. When a court dissolves a marriage or civil union, that relationship is 
recognized as having been real. 
But even when a court refuses to recognize the legal validity of the same-sex 
marriage or civil union, it is forced to recognize and perform the “speakability” 
of same-sex marriage.46 Judith Butler, in connecting the “domain of the sayable” 
with subjectivity, argues that “[t]o embody the norms that govern speakability 
in one’s speech is to consummate one’s status as a subject of speech.”47 Butler 
further argues that prohibition in the form of censorship is often contradictory, 
speaking the very thing that it seeks to prohibit. “The regulation that states 
what it does not want stated thwarts its own desire . . . . Such regulations 
introduce the censored speech into public discourse, thereby establishing it as a 
site of contestation, that is, as the scene of public utterance that it sought to 
preempt.”48 
With each utterance of a migrating marriage, same-sex marriage is 
constituted as coherent—speakable—part of the domain of the sayable, 
although its materiality may be spatially deferred: it exists somewhere else. The 
courts in these cases are forced to recognize the validity of a Vermont civil 
union in Vermont, or a Massachusetts same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, or a 
Canadian same-sex marriage in Canada. These marriages and civil unions are 
reiterated as real, as of the present, even if this temporal reality is 
geographically confined. It is the antinomical moment: nonrecognition becomes 
a form of recognition. Indeed, the migrating-marriage cases are themselves a 
kind of performative act, enacting that which they seek to name or have 
recognized. The dual act of marrying and migrating is then followed by a third 
moment of seeking legal recognition for that which has already occurred. The 
law may—or more often than not does—refuse this legal recognition. But when 
this act of refusal occurs on the terrain of conflict of laws, it is itself an 
acknowledgement of the act of marriage that has come before. The marriage is 
real, just not in the here and now, but in the there and then. The marriages 
migrate, even if only in the imagination: it is migration that can now be 
imagined in law, even if it is not actually recognized by the courts as legally 
valid within their geographic and jurisprudential jurisdiction. 
 
 45. See BRENDA COSSMAN, SEXUAL CITIZENS: THE LEGAL AND CULTURAL REGULATION OF 
SEX AND BELONGING (2007). 
 46. See generally JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE 133 
(1997) (discussing the “domain of the sayable” in constituting subjectivity). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 130 (emphasis omitted). 
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Those who oppose the recognition of same-sex marriage seem to recognize, 
at least implicitly, this migration of the imaginary and its significance in 
producing same-sex marriage as real in the present. In KJB v. JSP, the Iowa 
divorce case, Congressman Steve King—one of the petitioners who 
unsuccessfully challenged the validity of the divorce decree—issued the 
following statement: “Unicorns, leprechauns, gay marriages in Iowa—these are 
all things you will never find because they just don’t exist. But perhaps Judge 
Neary would grant divorces to unicorns and leprechauns too.”49 In this quote, 
Congressman King is engaging the imaginary to preempt its migration. Scorn 
and ridicule become the discursive strategy for denying even the possibility of a 
politics of the present. The gap between legal and cultural recognition is 
performed in reverse: legal recognition of same-sex marriage is met with its 
cultural repudiation. 
The same-sex-marriage conflicts cases can be seen to parallel the New York 
Times wedding announcements’ long-term inclusion of same-sex commitment 
ceremonies, civil unions, and marriages.50 These announcements are part of a 
cultural politics constituting same-sex marriages as real in the here and now. 
Many of the “wedding” announcements that are published are of commitment 
ceremonies entered in jurisdictions such as New York that do not recognize 
same-sex marriage or civil unions.51 It is not legality that these announcements 
are announcing; it is the cultural legitimacy of the unions, a cultural legitimacy 
that is enhanced by affirmation in the New York Times. Many other 
announcements are those of migrating marriages, with couples traveling to 
Vermont to enter civil unions or Canada to enter same-sex marriages, and then 
returning home again. With these migrating-marriage announcements, the legal 
recognition is more ambiguous and geographically displaced; the marriage is 
not legally recognized in their domiciled state (often but not always New York), 
but it is recognized somewhere else.52 This geographical dislocation, alongside 
the cultural recognition of the union, in turn casts a shadow over the failure to 
be legally recognized at home. 
Consider the announcement of the marriage of Thea Spyer and Edith 
Windsor.53  The announcement follows the standard form convention, beginning 
with: “Thea Clara Spyer and Edith Schlain Windsor were married in Toronto 
on Tuesday. Justice Harvey Brownstone of the North Toronto Family Court 
 
 49. Press Release, Congressman Steve King, King Reacts to Lesbian Divorce in Sioux City, (Dec. 
12, 2003), available at http://www.house.gov/list/press/ia05_king/pr_031212.html (last visited May 13, 
2008). 
 50. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 51. See, e.g., Wedding Announcement, Thea Spyer, Edith Windsor, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2007, at 
914. 
      52.   The governor of New York has since directed all state agencies to recognize same-sex 
marriages performed in other jurisdictions. Jeremy W. Peters, New York to Back Same-Sex Unions 
From Elsewhere, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2008, at A1. A lawsuit seeking to block the governor’s directive 
has been subsequently brought. Jeremy W. Peters, Suit Seeks to Block State Policy on Same-Sex Union, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2008, at B3. 
 53. Id. 
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officiated . . . .” In the paragraphs that follow, we are told that Dr. Spyer is 75, 
and Ms. Windsor is 77, and that they have been together for forty years. The 
final paragraphs read, 
Dr. Spyer, who has become a quadriplegic as a result of advanced multiple sclerosis, 
said of the weekend, and her time spent with Ms. Windsor: “It was a feeling of 
complete delight in being with her. I had a real sense of ‘I’ve landed in my life.’” 
That was 40 years ago. 
Dr. Spyer had the help of three aids who traveled with her to Canada to officially 
marry Ms. Windsor, ending an engagement that began in 1967.54 
The announcement and, more generally, the wedding, garnered broad 
media attention.55 The coverage emphasized the age of the parties, the longevity 
of their relationship, and, above all, the declining health of Spyer. In a Globe 
and Mail article, Ms. Windsor was quoted as saying, “‘On one occasion recently 
it looked like it was going to be very close to the end . . . . We just said—We’re 
running out of time.’”56 The article explicitly tied their wedding ceremony to the 
broader politics of same-sex marriage in the United States, noting that 1,597 
American couples have traveled to Toronto to wed since same-sex marriage 
became available there in June 2003. It also noted that the wedding was 
organized by Brendan Fay, founder of the New York-based Civil Marriage 
Trail project, which has assisted same-sex couples get married in Canada.57 
The New York Times wedding announcements provide a fascinating forum 
where couples like Spyer and Windsor can emerge—however temporarily—as 
the poster children of same-sex marriage. Their wedding may have been a 
small, intimate affair. And they no doubt married for the meaning it produced 
in their own private lives. But the wedding announcement in the New York 
Times transformed their intimate ceremony into a very public affair, and a very 
political intervention into the cultural contestations over same-sex marriage.58 
Their long-term relationship, their advanced age, and Dr. Spyer’s declining 
health together produced an image of dignity long denied. It is a kind of politics 
of sentimentality, producing an imaginary of same-sex marriage that not only 
exists in the present, but that is emotionally compelling. Moreover, the 
migratory dimension of this marriage is deployed to heighten its poignancy: 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. See, e.g., Best New York Times Lesbian Wedding Notice Ever: Thea Spyer & Edith Windsor, 
Posting of Michael Petrelis to The Petrelis Files, http://mpetrelis.blogspot.com/2007/05/best-ny-times-
lesbian-wedding-notice.html (May 29, 2007, 11:56 PST) (describing the announcement as “the most 
emotionally moving and terrific human story of all the gay and lesbian New York Times wedding 
announcements ever to hit the pages of the Gray Lady”). 
 56. Siri Agrell, A 40-Year Wait for Wedded Bliss, GLOBE & MAIL, May 31, 2007, at L1. 
 57. Id. 
 58. The couple was not new to the world of same-sex marriage politics. Ms. Windsor was a long-
time activist: in 2005 she became a “marriage ambassador” trained by Empire State Pride, a program 
designed to educate the public about the realities of gay-and-lesbian families and to lobby for same-sex-
marriage rights. Chris Lombardi, Ambassadors Are Representing the Face of Marriage, VILLAGER, 
(June 13–19, 2007), available at http://www.thevillager.com/villager_215/ambassadorsare.html (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2004). 
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look at the lengths to which these couples must go in order to marry before they 
die. Spyer and Windsor’s migrating marriage is an emotionally charged 
intervention in the politics of same-sex marriage, signifying the multitude of 
reasons that same-sex marriage is right, and that New York’s failure to 
recognize it is wrong. The cultural space of the wedding announcement 
produces both a powerful image of same-sex marriage in the here and now and, 
at the same time, a powerful denunciation of its absence. 
 Migrating marriages, and the early cases in which these marriages are 
being contested, occupy a space not unlike Big Love and its mock wedding 
announcement, which plays precisely on the gap between law and culture, and 
between legal and cultural recognition. The New York Times wedding 
announcement produces the latter without requiring the former. Same-sex 
marriages become real but not legal in the here and now, producing same-sex 
marriage in a kind of liminal space, somewhere in between cultural recognition 
and legal nonrecognition. Yet, their cultural recognition is constitutive of the 
very thing that seeks legal recognition; cultural marriages then set out to 
become legal marriages, sometimes by deploying the tools of conflicts, but often 
simply by constituting same-sex marriage as real within the cultural imaginary. 
Big Love plays on an even more decisive gap: polygamous marriages are not 
legal—in Utah or anywhere else in the country. Yet the point and the 
poignancy of the show is to depict a “real-life” family. Bill Hendrickson and his 
three wives struggle with all of the daily trials of contemporary family life: 
parenting, finances, intimacy, and sex. The sympathetic portrayal of their family 
is as culturally real, although it suffers by virtue of its nonlegal recognition. 
IV 
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS LIMINALITY 
Same-sex couples are getting married. Some seek to travel from here to 
there and then seek legal recognition of these marriages here. They are forced 
onto the terrain of the law of conflicts as they seek dissolution, legal incidents, 
or more general recognition. But, when same-sex marriage is involved, we 
cannot even pretend to treat the terrain as purely private. This is not a zone of 
autonomous individuals who can freely pick and choose their own laws with 
effect in their home states; this is not a zone where such individuals can even 
seek to mimic this discourse. It is a zone where states remain sovereign and 
where individuals must submit to their higher law. Conflict scholars may be 
seeking to transform same-sex marriage contestations into choice-of-law 
analysis, deploying the technical tools of the trade. But their strategic gesture 
has not translated into a discursive shift from politics to legal technologies. 
Migrating same-sex marriages remain resolutely political, and the turn to 
conflicts does little to obscure or obviate the underlying normative stakes. 
Given the transparency of these politics, it may be more productive to 
approach the strategic gesture of these conflicts scholars and conflicts cases as a 
deeply cultural strategy that requires an analysis of the relationship between 
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legal strategy and the production of cultural meaning. Sometimes, private 
litigants are simply seeking an individual remedy; they want to get out of their 
marriage, or they desperately need a legal incident of marriage, such as 
bankruptcy protection. But, the turn toward the private is at the same time part 
of the politics of producing same-sex marriage in the present, through the dual 
and sometimes dueling strategies of legal and cultural recognition. And even 
those parties who simply want out of their marriages get caught up in these 
politics of recognition. It is, moreover, a politics that cannot be measured in 
terms of winning or losing on the legal question of interstate recognition. These 
marriages are migrating, with or without legal recognition, and each legal 
moment reiterates their representational reality, even if only somewhere else. 
Conflict of laws is implicated, in ways that cannot be fully appreciated from 
inside the traditional doctrinal and policy concerns of the discipline, in this 
liminality of same-sex marriage—that is, in producing same-sex marriage in a 
state of ambiguity and transition where borders are fluid, disorienting, and not 
fully crossed. Same-sex marriage is neither recognized nor unrecognized, but 
lives in the gap between cultural and legal nonrecognition. Indeed, the 
migrating-marriage cases play a unique role in producing this liminal state and 
place of same-sex marriage: conflicts-of-laws is called upon when marriages try 
to cross borders. The courts may be deploying conflicts of laws in a kind of 
border patrol, refusing legal passage, yet they cannot prevent its seepage into 
the cultural imagination on the other side brought on by each of the legal 
challenges. These migrating-marriage cases challenge the traditional confines of 
doctrinal or policy approaches to conflicts, suggesting that we cannot fully grasp 
this strategic turn toward the private without attention to these contestations, 
deferrals, and reversals of cultural meaning. 
